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from Autonomy to Alliance

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Volume 51
A volume in the *Critical Issues* project
'Redefining Europe'

Probing the Boundaries

Expanded EU

from Autonomy to Alliance

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Rodopi

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2008

The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of "ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents - Requirements for permanence".

ISBN: 978-90-420-2482-3
©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2008
Printed in the Netherlands

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The Interaction between Democracy and Peace: Bridging the Gap between Liberalism and Realism in International Relations

Nejat Dogan

Abstract

Both liberalism and realism provide a partial explanation of the interaction between democracy and peace. Even if democracies might be conducive to peaceful foreign relations, we however still have to work with the international systemic forces; national interests and security concerns did, and in the future may, drive nations to many conflicts. We should, then, bridge the gap between liberalism and realism. Toward this end, pragmatism may provide the basic philosophical principles. Pragmatic liberalism, as a distinct approach to International Relations, suggests that rather than a top-down approach such as imposing democracies on nations or considering world politics a power game nations play, we need a bottom-up approach that would study and emphasise the effect of domestic forces on improving relations between humans and states alike in the international system. This approach can bridge the gap between liberalism and realism in many issues of world politics such as the role of states, sovereignty, norms, power, and the regime type. Democracy may help us in the endeavour to create a pluralistic world, but imposing such a regime on nations against their will would conflict with the very values that democracy wants to promote. The appreciation of liberal democratic principles such as nonviolence, belief in human values, resorting to peaceful means in solving political problems, and promoting social justice may help create regional as well as perpetual peace.

Keywords

Democracy, peace, democratic-peace theory, realism, pragmatism, liberalism, pragmatic liberalism

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1. Introduction

This article reflects on the debate between liberalism and realism with regard to the democratic peace theory, that is, whether democracies fight each other. According to liberals, democracies have never fought each other, but they rather have pursued peace in their relations and abstained from threatening each other with war. Therefore, by somewhat broadly interpreting Kant's political writings, liberals have suggested that all nations should have democratic governments in order for world peace to become a reality. From this perspective, domestic characteristics of states are directly related to their

foreign policy behaviour. Realists, on the other hand, believe that states are "like units." Situated in an anarchic international system, all states perform the same function of preserving and improving their relative power in the system in an attempt to ensure their survival. Domestic characteristics of states, then, do not affect their foreign policy behaviour, which is rather imposed on states from outside.

Both the liberal and the realist explanations of the interaction between domestic politics and foreign politics, however, have many flaws. A close reading of diplomatic history demonstrates that democracies not only threatened each other many times with the use of force but also fought each other on occasions. On the other hand, domestic characteristics of states such as ideology have played a critical role in the outbreak and escalation of violence between states. Therefore, one should bridge the gap between the two approaches to provide policy makers with better policy choices and to keep the hope for peaceful relations between nations. Pragmatic liberalism is such an approach. The melioristic worldview of pragmatic liberalism suggests that, although it may take considerable time and require much effort, we can improve the international system. Peace, form this perspective, is neither inevitable nor impossible.

The article elaborates on these points in three main sections. The first section reviews the liberal argument of democratic peace and then provides a critique of this argument. The second section discusses the realist explanation of the interaction between domestic and foreign politics. The third section introduces pragmatism as an approach that can bridge the gap between the liberal and realist approaches to International Relations. Although the paper acknowledges that democracies may be conducive to peaceful foreign relations, it holds, however, that one should reject the dogmatism of the democratic-peace theory. This is critical not only for theoretical but also for practical reasons, because intervention in domestic politics of states to establish democratic governments has become almost a moral duty of the international society that, especially in the last two decades, has been causing violence around the world.

2. Liberalism and the Democratic Peace Theory

A. The Liberal Argument Summarised

Liberals believe that political regime of a certain state is directly related to its foreign policy behaviour. At least beginning with Woodrow Wilson, liberal political activists have argued that a democratic regime is conducive to peaceful relations in international politics. Liberalism, therefore, holds that if all states become democratic, then, we may achieve "perpetual peace," which Immanuel Kant theorised more than two centuries ago. For liberals, then, domestic political characteristics of states determine their foreign policies.

Liberal scholars provide two sets of reasons for democratic states' pursuing peaceful foreign policies toward one another: first, democratic norms and culture and, second, political structures and institutions. However, liberals argue that these reasons are complementary and overlapping rather than they compete each other.[1]

Liberals believe that all democracies share some particular *norms*. "The basic norm is that disputes can be resolved without force through democratic political processes that in some balance ensure both majority rule and minority rights."[2] Equality of citizens before the law, illegitimacy of resorting to violence, the right to organisational opposition, and loyalty to the system are also provided as critical norms. These norms, so the argument goes, place restraints on policymakers at the domestic level. As a result, individuals perceive that they are autonomous and self-governing, and this raises positive thoughts in people's mind about the rights of individuals living in other democracies. This peaceful inclination of democratic peoples toward one another prevents their policymakers from pursuing aggressive behaviour in the conduct of their relations. In other words, democracies externalise norms. Since democratic leaders are certain of one another's possible reaction to a crisis, they do not resort to force but solve their problems through peaceful means. On the other hand, a democracy does not expect undemocratic states to respect these norms and, therefore, it may resort to force if threatened by the latter. In short, "whereas wars against other democratic states are neither expected nor considered legitimate, wars against authoritarian states may often be both."[3]

Besides norms, liberals also believe that *institutions* place restraints on policymakers in world politics. The division of power among the legislature, judiciary, and executive branches of a democratic government creates checks and balances in its domestic politics that in turn limits the authority of policymakers. Moreover, public opinion opposes the use of force because it is the citizens who ultimately pay the bill in a war. According to liberals, during a crisis the leader of a democratic state perceives that other democratic leaders are constrained by similar institutions and does not fear of a surprise attack. As a result, leaders find enough time to give peaceful means a chance. In contrast, violent conflicts may occur both between undemocratic states and between democratic and undemocratic states. Being aware that the adversary is free from institutional constraints, leaders of democratic states cannot risk a surprise attack and may resort to force.

B. The Critique of the Liberal Argument

Liberals seem to be arguing that simply democratic values and institutions did, and in the future can, create peaceful relations between like-minded states. However, this is a very broad reading of Kant. Perpetual peace, for Kant, can come true neither quickly nor easily. It is rather "the end

of the hard journey."[4] Some wars must be waged, and some lessons must be learned in this process. Kant theorises that *republican* states can build a security community among themselves and may have to resort to force to protect this community. Kant bases his hope for perpetual peace on leadership and nature. "If he lives among others of his own species," Kant writes, "man is *an animal who needs a master*." This master, however, can be found "nowhere else but in the human species."[5] Leaders will be aided by nature in their endeavour to both create a zone of peace among republican states and ultimately realise world peace. "Perpetual peace," Kant argues, "is *guaranteed* by no less an authority than the great artist *nature* herself."[6] Kant concludes as follows:

> Even if people were not compelled by internal dissent to submit to the coercion of public laws, war would produce the same effect from outside. What men have neglected to do will ultimately happen of its own accord, albeit with much inconvenience. As Bouterwek puts it, 'if the reed is bent too far, it breaks; and he who wants too much gets nothing'.[7]

Liberals nowadays seem to be wanting too much and too quickly. A close reading of diplomatic history demonstrates there have been some instances that democracies fought each other as well as threatened each other with the use of force. The proponents of the democratic peace theory, however, generally disregarded these instances. Examples include: Finland versus the allies in the Second World War; the United States versus Britain in 1812 and in 1895/1896; the Fashoda crisis of 1898; and the Ruhr crisis of 1923.[8]

Although John Owen attempts to explain these "anomalies," he basically fails to do so because perception has been provided as the reason for both the existence and the absence of war. Owen argues that "often states did not consider each other democratic, [and] thus the anticipated normative check on war was frequently absent. A liberal democracy will only avoid war with a state that *it believes to be liberal.*"[9] Accordingly, the war broke out in 1812 because the U.S. did not consider Britain a liberal democracy, and a war did not break out in 1895 because the U.S. believed that Britain had become a democracy. This might be considered a poor explanation, since it adds up to reducing all policy choices to perception. One can argue then, for example, the allies went to war against Hitler because they did not *consider* Germany a democracy; and the Arab states and Israel have been fighting each other for over half a century because one side does not *consider* the other a liberal democracy. Liberals have avoided discussing the role that ideologies as well as security and economic concerns have played in international conflicts. The ideology of Germany was one of the main causes of the Second World War

and the security concerns have contributed to the escalation of violence in the Middle East since 1945. In other words, it does not seem rational to explain the outbreak as well as the absence of war with one variable, that is, perception.

Moreover, liberals have generally been, and should be, criticised for both their ambiguous concepts and narrow definitions. For one thing, the meanings of both democracy and war change from scholar to scholar. For another, liberals have chosen to narrowly define these terms so as to leave out of the discussion some historical cases that challenge their assumptions. In Russett's work, for example, wars are defined as organised violence between sovereign states that leave at least one thousand fatalities on the battlefield. In this way, civil wars, wars of liberation, colonial wars as well as wars with less than a thousand fatalities are not included in the research. However, one should not put his or her idealistic views to the test of such an arbitrary quantitative analysis. Russett also brings a "stability or longevity" qualification for democracy and argues that "some period must elapse during which democratic processes and institutions can become established, so that both the citizens of the *democratic* state and its adversary can regard it as one governed by democratic principles."[10] Given the cultural differences of states, how can one measure the necessary period for the institutionalisation of democracy; or can longevity be a condition of democracy? What does the word "transition" refer to? Liberals have failed to provide plausible answers to these questions. In fact, one cannot know whether time is a relevant factor in the transformation of a certain state into a democracy. As David Spiro argues, "societal norms do not necessarily result from entrenched political processes."[11]

Furthermore, Kant's notion of democratic republicanism is quite different from today's democracies. How can one, then, explain two centuries of international relations with a single definition of democracy? Being aware of this theoretical flaw, liberals bring into discussion other variables such as perception, but this does not solve the methodological problems in their works. In other words, it is an anachronism to apply today's definitions, or democratic notions, to the developments of the nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries, the historical periods in which liberals have generally tested their hypotheses. Therefore liberals should be more concerned about defining and explaining their variables.

Liberals, especially Owen, also argue that institutional and cultural variables of the democratic peace theory are complementary and overlapping. However, they fail to explain exactly how, or to what extent, these variables interact or reinforce each other. Rather, as Russett does, liberals discuss these variables separately. Their argument, therefore, loses some of its explanatory power. Moreover, it is not clear whether liberals mean that democracies *never* fight each other or that democracies *rarely* fight each other. If they mean the latter, then, they should explain under which conditions the democratic peace theory does not hold. Liberals are not clear about the

ultimate prescription, or promise, of their research project either. Owen, for example, seems to be more pessimistic than both Doyle and Russett about the feasibility of perpetual peace.

Liberals in fact acknowledge that realist notions such as power, capability, and anarchy matter. Owen argues that he does not "contest the relevance of power politics to the foreign policies of liberal democracies."[12] Similarly, Russett asserts he is "happy to grant that power and strategic interest greatly affect the calculations of all states, including democracies."[13] However, neither Owen nor Russett explains how power politics is relevant to their analyses. In order for the democratic peace theory to be convincing, liberals should explain how power calculations, power shifts, and the structure of the international system affect the foreign policy behaviour of democracies as well as how institutional and cultural factors of democracies may prevent the power politics from disrupting peaceful relations among democracies.[14]

Even if democracies may be peaceful, this does not promise a peaceful environment because democracies may fail to externalise the democratic norms. Russett seems to be quite sure that any democracy did and will externalise these norms; however, his whole explanation rests on the argument of perception. "If people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live," Russett writes, "they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-governing elite."[15] Nevertheless, since elites or leaders may easily control peoples, since both responsive or ideologically-driven leaders may come to power in both democracies and autocracies, and since perceptions and ideas may easily change, then, there is not any reason not to expect that individuals' perceptions may turn out to be wrong or the public opinion may be manipulated before it places a pacific pressure on the policymakers. Projects such as "zone of peace" and "security community," therefore, cannot be easily realised.

We should also touch on the policy implications of the democratic peace theory. At least since the end of the Cold War, the international society has come to believe that forcible interventions in domestic politics of states are both necessary and effective. The use of force has been considered both permissible and good, and intervention in trouble spots around the world has become almost a moral duty of states as well as international institutions. Most people now criticise the international society when it does *not* intervene in domestic conflicts. The international law regarding the use of force and some traditional values in the system such as the political independence and territorial integrity of states have recently come to be interpreted very broadly.

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, for example, asserts that "the prohibitions

against the use of force in the UN Charter [are] contextual, not absolute."[16] Accordingly, these prohibitions should be interpreted by taking all the provisions of the Charter into account, including those concerning human rights. This contextual approach suggests that the UN Charter is not neutral between political regimes. The Charter rather prefers governments that permit freedom and democracy, and it is committed to democratic values and practices. "Where one state uses armed force or economic and military assistance to aid in the suppression of democratic values and practices," so the argument goes, "other states are free to act to redress the balance and stop the forcible repression of these values."[17] Therefore, this approach has considered it permissible "to use military force or provide other assistance to impose or restore democracy."[18] Although the use of force to turn nations into democracies conflicts with the principles of the UN Charter,[19] Kirkpatrick has been one of its ardent supporters. She argues that national interests cannot be value free and amoral, but that they should be guided by notions such as democracy, freedom, and human rights.[20] The desirable norm, for this approach, is "a world of sovereign states in which the principle of *democratic* self-determination is respected."[21] On an occasion Kirkpatrick also argued before the UN General Assembly that, "the test of law lies not in the assertion of abstract principles but in the *application of universal norms* to specific situations."[22] In short, in the last two decades the moral duty of spreading democracy around the world has not only led to a growing interest in studying the relationship between democracy and peace but also to many forcible interventions defended by some practitioners of international politics such as Kirkpatrick.

3. Realism and the Domestic Characteristics of States

Having criticised the liberal explanation of the democratic peace theory, we should turn to realism, which has been generally considered as the dominant theory of International Relations, in an attempt to find out whether it provides any plausible explanation regarding the interaction between the domestic characteristics of states and foreign policy behaviour.

Realists argue that domestic characteristics of states do not affect their foreign policy behaviour. From the realist perspective, situated in an anarchy, that is the absence of a central authority in the international system that would both prevent states from resorting to war and enforce certain principles of conduct in their foreign relations, all states perform the same function of ensuring their own survival. "The states that are the units of international-political systems," Kenneth Waltz writes, "are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform. Anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system's units, and that implies their sameness."[23] Then, in terms of their foreign policies, states are alike. "National politics," Waltz argues, "consists of *differentiated* units performing specified functions.

International politics consists of *like units* duplicating one another's activities."[24] Although states perform same functions in the system, this does not mean however they have the same abilities to perform them. "The differences are of capability, not of function."[25] Therefore, Waltz and other realists define the international structure in terms of major actors and the structural change by the distribution of capabilities across states.

For realists, then, the character of the regime of states does not have any effect on their foreign policy behaviour. Anarchy forces a state to ensure its own survival in the system through maximising its relative power. Christopher Layne summarises the realist argument: "International political behaviour is characterised by continuity, regularity, and repetition because states are constrained by the international system's unchanging (and probably unchangeable) structure. In a realist world, survival and security are always at risk, and democratic states will respond no differently to democratic rivals than to non-democratic ones."[26] Therefore, from the realist perspective, a zone of peace or a security community, let alone perpetual peace, is nothing but a utopian prescription.

Realist arguments, however, are not free from flaws. In the first place, beyond all concerns about being parsimonious, it seems to be reductionism to assume that all states follow similar foreign policies regardless of their regime type. Not only the rules of the international system, but also ideas, norms, and ideologies may shape and shove national foreign policies.[27] Nazism, fascism, and communism as powerful ideologies, for example, did play as an important role as German, Italian, and Soviet economic and security concerns did in the process leading up to the Second World War. Realism, therefore, may fail to differentiate between domestic and structural reasons of war and between benign and malign foreign policies. In addition, realists have yet to provide consistent definitions of both war and democracy. Because of this, they have failed to agree on whether to include some certain types of war, such as civil wars, into their analyses.

Since the weaknesses of liberalism seem to be the strengths of realism, we shall not reiterate them here. However, we should stress some of the observations mentioned above. Realism, first of all, may enable the student of International Relations to make better and more informed suggestions about the possible behaviour of states in some certain situations. To assume that imposing one type of regime on states can transform the nature of interstate relations may be neither logical nor desirable. The realist assumptions such as the anarchic nature of the international system and survival being the primary concern of states can lead to a better explanation of the anomalies in world politics. Moreover, national interest and the will to power may be better tools in explaining foreign policy differences of states across time and issues. Realists acknowledge that interests of states cannot be identical and some particular interests of states can remain unchanged. As a

result, one can differentiate between states on the basis of their national interests and predict their foreign policies through identifying some broad and stable interests in their foreign policies.

Moreover, not one type of government or one type of leadership can be associated with one particular type of foreign policy behaviour. Hermann and Kegley assert that both responsive and ideologically-driven leaders may gain power in either democracies or autocracies whereas Andreski even argues that military dictatorships may, in fact, be peaceful.[28] Therefore one should theorise a more complex world and expect more uncertainty in world politics than liberals do.

4. A Pragmatic Approach to the Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Politics

The argument above suffices to conclude that both liberalism and realism have flaws in the explanation of the interaction between domestic and foreign politics. However, both of these approaches also provide a partial, though valuable, explanation of international politics. Unlike what liberals have been arguing, democracies went to war with each other and threatened each other with the use of force. Their explanation of the "anomalies" with such variables as perception is not convincing. They are yet to provide a convincing causal mechanism between democratic government and peace.[29] The realist argument that the number of possible conflict dyads between democracies was negligible before the Second World War has great validity. Moreover, during the Cold War, besides preserving the stability, the structural variables such as the bipolar nature of the system might have alleviated the problems between the democratic nations.[30]

The demise of the Soviet Union has provided a security environment that will enable the students of International Relations to better test the contesting theories regarding the democratic peace. However, the course of international relations since then has not been very promising for a zone of peace, or perpetual peace. Incidences such as the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific and the British reaction to the European Union's policies during the crisis of mad-cow disease demonstrated that if certain policies are pushed too hard, democratic nations may fail to keep harmonious relations. In addition, the new international system has not ended the old conflicts. For example, although both Turkey and Greece are now democratic, they have many times come to the brink of war. The recent Kardak/Imia crisis once again demonstrated the power of raison-d'état on both sides of the Aegean.[31]

The liberals' argument, then, raises serious doubts in the minds of the students of International Relations. On the other hand, however, realists suggest that states are locked within an "unchanging and probably unchangeable international system"[32] that makes it almost redundant for the same students to provide any outline for a relatively peaceful world.

Therefore, one can conclude that both liberal and realist arguments with regard to the interaction between democratic values and foreign policy behaviour of states are dogmatic and, therefore, should be equally resisted. Peoples as well as most leaders want to see world peace become a reality. Toward this end, one should pursue a more informed approach to international politics than both *utopian liberalism* and *pessimistic realism*.

Pragmatism can provide the philosophical principles for such a new approach to International Relations that may be labelled as "pragmatic liberalism."[33] From this evolutionary perspective, although states did, and in the foreseeable future will, resort to force, it is however possible to gradually improve the interstate relations.

This pragmatic approach to world politics suggests that one should keep his or her hope for improving the system and for democratic values to triumph over autocratic and totalitarian values. In other words, it rejects both liberals' optimism and realists' pessimism with regard to the possibility of change in the system. It rather holds a *melioristic* view. Though not inevitable, gradual improvement is possible. Starting with what we have, we can hope to improve interstate relations and transform the international system into a relatively peaceful one. Therefore, rather than arguing that power is fungible or avoiding the role that power plays at every social level, it suggests the management of power through institutions. Power, as such, is a problem to be managed rather than something to be eliminated.[34]

From this perspective, some rules such as the territorial integrity and political independence of states that contributed to the stabilisation of the international system at least since 1648 should be respected. The state as a political institution is neither out-of-date nor the main actor in world politics but still useful; and sovereignty is neither problematic nor inviolable, but it determines the responsibilities and duties of states in the system. Pragmatic liberalism also holds that international institutions are neither key to world order nor epiphenomenal but, through their various functions, they help the international system to become relatively orderly. This pragmatic approach also rejects both liberals' universalism and realists' relativism as normative approaches to world politics. The end product of such an approach, therefore, is neither "one world" as argued by utopian liberalism nor "balance of power" as defended by realists. It is rather a *pluralistic* liberal world.

Pragmatic liberalism considers the regime type of states *relevant* to world peace. However, it rejects forcible interventions in the domestic politics of states. In fact, a good society can only be the product of its own people. As Claude and Nuechterlein argue, "a good society cannot be given by one state to another state, nor can it be imposed on a state from an outside source. A good society has to come from the genius of the people concerned. They can be helped and protected in their attempts to improve a society, but no one can make it happen for them."[35] A society, then, has to want and

deserve democracy, which cannot and should not be provided from outside.[36] Otherwise the international society can easily create violent states with partial "democratic" institutions.

A close reading of Kant, in fact, demonstrates that he opposes resorting to force for changing the domestic characteristics of a state. One of his preliminary articles of a perpetual peace between states reads as follows: "No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state."[37] Intervening in the domestic politics of a state would mean, for Kant, to deprive its citizens of their moral autonomy, since "the subjects are thereby used and misused as objects to be manipulated at will."[38] A state has its own life for Kant, "it is a society of men, which no-one other than itself can command or dispose of. Like a tree, it has its own roots."[39]

5. Conclusion

Both liberalism and realism provide a partial explanation of the interaction between democracy and peace in particular and of international politics in general. Even if democracies might be conducive to peaceful foreign relations, we however still have to work with the international systemic forces. National interests and security concerns did, and in the future may, drive nations to many conflicts. Therefore, in building theories of International Relations and formulating foreign policies we cannot disregard the systemic forces. To improve the existing international system, however, we can bridge the gap between liberalism and realism. Toward this end, pragmatism provides the basic philosophical principles.

Pragmatic liberalism, as a distinct approach to International Relations, suggests that rather than a top-down approach such as imposing democracies on nations, we need a bottom-up approach that would study and emphasise the effect of domestic forces on improving relations between humans and states alike in the international system. This approach can bridge the gap between liberalism and realism in many issues of world politics such as the role of states and international organisations, sovereignty, norms, power, and the regime type. Democracy may help us in the endeavour to create a pluralistic world, but imposing such a regime on nations against their will would conflict with the very values that democracy wants to promote.

Not a certain type of government, but the appreciation of liberal democratic principles such as nonviolence, belief in human values, resorting to peaceful means in solving political problems, and promoting social justice can create regional peace as well as perpetual peace. Nature, as Kant theorised, will help us in this endeavour. But it seems we also need to help nature- another fact that is appreciated by Kant. Liberals have disregarded the effect of the systemic forces on foreign policy formulation, whereas realists have rejected to see the possibility that human beings can modify the nature of international politics and even transform the system. Liberals have stressed

the role of institutions and realists the structures. But Kant has in mind, first of all, the individual and a certain moral approach to international politics in theorising perpetual peace.

Therefore, any theory that does not take into account the interaction between the individual and the structure borders on dogmatism; and any political regime that does not adopt as its main objective the improvement of the position of the individual at every social level should be opposed regardless of its label. "Although politics in itself a difficult art," Kant concludes, "no art is required to combine it with morality. For as soon as the two come into conflict, morality can cut through the knot which politics cannot untie. The rights of man must be held sacred, however a great sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here. All politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance."[40]

Notes

[1] See John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace", *International Security* 19, No. 2 (Fall1994): 87-125.
[2] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 31.
[3] Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 32.
[4] Cited in Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, No. 4 (December 1986): 1163.
[5] Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46.
[6] Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 108.
[7] Ibid., pp. 112-113.
[8] For the discussion of these cases, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, No. 2 (Fall1994), pp. 5-49.
[9] Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," pp. 91, 102.
[10] Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 16.
[11] David Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," *International Security* 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 56.
[12] Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," p. 121.
[13] Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 166.
[14] Schweller's study may be considered a contribution to liberalism in this regard. See Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies

More Pacific?," *World Politics* 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235-269.
[15] Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 31.
[16] Cited in Robert J. Beck, *The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Printing Office, student edition, 1993), 37.
[17] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, "The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law," in *Right V. Might: International Law and the Use of Force* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 34.
[18] Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, *International Law* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1991), 1242.
[19] See, for example, the judgment delivered by the International Court of Justice in the "Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua," in Carter and Trimble, *International law*, pp. 1254-1274.
[20] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *The United States and the World: Setting Limits* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1986), 2.
[21] Kirkpatrick and Gerson, "The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law," p. 31.
[22] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 38. Emphasis added.
[23] Kenneth W. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 93.
[24] Ibid., p. 97. Emphasis added.
[25] Ibid., p. 96.
[26] Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," pp. 10, 12.
[27] See, for example, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Judith Goldstein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), passim.
[28] Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives From Political Psychology," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 511-533; and Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 3, No. 3 (December 1980), pp. 3-10.
[29] Scott Gates, Torbjorn L. Knutsen, and Jonathon W. Moses, "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, No. 1 (February 1996), p. 7.
[30] For the realist explanation of the absence of a major war during the Cold War, or the structural reasons for the relative stability in the system, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, No.1 (Summer1990), pp. 5-56; and, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System", *International Security* 10, No. 4 (Spring1986), pp. 99-142.
[31] Compare the following web pages of the Turkish

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/aded/> and the Greek Ministries of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gr/arxeion-web/hwebct.exe?-V=hindex_uk&-A=89105&-w=KARDAK_&-P> on the Kardak/Imia crisis. Also see the following two articles on the Turkish-Greek dyad with regard to the democratic peace theory: Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, "Democratic Peace and the European Security Community: The Paradox of Greece and Turkey", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 69-85; and Fiona B. Adamson, "Democratisation and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis", *Political Science Quarterly* 116, No. 2 (July 2001), pp. 277-303.

[32] For this Realist argument see, for example, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[33] For the discussion of pragmatic liberalism, see Nejat Dogan, *Inis L. Claude, Jr. and World Order: A Pragmatic Liberal Approach*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Virginia, 2001. For a summary of the basic principles of pragmatism, see Nejat Dogan, "Pragmatizmin Felsefi Temelleri", *Erciyes Universitesi Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakultesi Dergisi* 20 (January-June 2003), pp. 83-93.

[34] See Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), 6-9; and Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations," *International Organization* XV, No. 2 (Spring 1961), pp. 219-220.

[35] Inis L. Claude, Jr. and Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Organizing Policy-Making: Defining U.S. Responsibilities," in Kenneth W. Thompson, *The Virginia Papers on the Presidency* XXX (Maryland: University Press of America, 1997), 44.

[36] On the discussion of this idea, see John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention", in Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Essays on Politics and Culture* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 396-413.

[37] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 96.

[38] Ibid., p.94.

[39] Ibid., p.94.

[40] Ibid., p. 125.