Chapter 2 World Order Proposals

After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

Learning Outcomes

1. Recount the philosophy of the world-government proposal
2. Evaluate the role of legalism in International Studies
3. Characterize the premises of functionalism and neofunctionalism
4. Summarize the arguments of cosmopolitanism
5. Recognize the balance of power and collective security as major systems for managing power relations

Chapter Outline

- World Government
- Legalism
- Functionalism
- Cosmopolitanism
- Collective Security and the Balance of Power as Systems for Managing Power Relations

Key Terms

• Order • World Order • Domestic Analogy
• Positive Peace • Negative Peace
• World Government • Legalism
• Functionalism • Neofunctionalism
• Liberalism • Meliorism • Pragmatism
• Cosmopolitanism • Collective Security
• Balance of Power • Management of Power
• Equilibrium of Power • Hegemonic Stability
• Internal Balancing • External Balancing
• Casual Commitment • Quasi-Pacifism



INTRODUCTION

Scholars have generally resorted to **domestic analogy** in their attempt to define order and put forward their arguments about how that order may be sustained and promoted. This is basically the method of looking at the domestic level, deducing general conclusions on how order has been sustained and promoted at the domestic level, and applying those conclusions to the international level. In a recent book on world-order proposals, **Hidemi Suganami** defines domestic analogy as follows: "presumptive reasoning which holds that there are certain similarities between domestic and international phenomena; that, in particular, the conditions of order within states are similar to those of order between them; and that therefore those institutions which sustain order domestically should be reproduced at the international level" (Suganami, 1989: 1).

Through the domestic analogy reasoning one can conclude that **world order** is associated with *a governable system* where relations among the constituent units are managed through peaceful means. For example, Inis L. Claude argues that world order "refers to the dependable absence of war or of intimidation by the threat of coercion. Stated positively, world order is a condition of the system, marked by the high probability that international relations will be peacefully managed. It suggests cosmos rather than chaos, settled patterns of behavior rather than unpredictability, and agreed rather than forced decisions" (Claude, 1990: 31-32).

From this definition, we can discern two definitions of world order- two closely related, yet, distinguishable definitions. The first one is the absence of war or the absence of coercion. We will call this order "**order in narrow sense**." This is also **peace in negative sense**. The second is a much broader definition of order; that is, *social order*, where the relations among the units at the international level are managed peacefully, where the claims to specific rights and privileges are solved through peaceful and objective procedures, and where repression and coercion are absent at both the national and international levels. At the same time, this is **peace in positive sense**. We lack, however, this kind of world order. In other words, we have failed so far to create "the successful state" at the international level. In fact, the successful state is far from being completed at the domestic level; failed states, civil wars as well as other types of violence such as terrorism around the world have convinced both politicians and students of International Relations that we are far from this liberal order. Nevertheless, this is where **meliorism** comes in; rather than being overly optimistic or pessimistic about the world's future, one can hope that it is possible to *gradually* create such a social world order.

Then the question is *how* can we go from here to there; what are the basic characteristics of the means we should employ toward a more orderly world? Here one can also resort to domestic analogy and try to understand the nature of order at the domestic level and more specifically the basic mission of the government in sustaining the domestic order. For example, according to Claude, one such *successful state* has been the United States. Therefore, he looks at the American experience more than any other state's experience to find out what the role of the government should be. American society constitutes a good example for Claude not only because Americans have been relatively successful in creating an orderly society, but also because they have been sensitive to protecting their pluralistic society. In sustaining order in its pluralistic society, the American government's role has been the *political management of relations among its constituent units through peaceful means*.

World-order proposals can be classified under the two grand theories of international relations. Under the **Realist** school, the most prominent proposal has been the classical balance of power theory. **Idealist** school, undoubtedly, has been more productive relative to the Realist school and produced proposals such as collective security, world government, legalism, functionalism, and cosmopolitanism (Doğan, 2012). In this chapter we will first concentrate on world government, legalism, functionalism, and cosmopolitanism. And then toward finding a solution to the question of how we can manage power in the international system, we will reflect on the balance of power theory and collective security.

WORLD GOVERNMENT

It is an old idea in political theory that one authority can and should sustain order at the global level. **Pax Romana** and **Pax Britannica**, for example, are known as eras of relative peace and order in world history that was provided by a single power- the **hegemon.** We see the reemergence of this idea especially after the Second World War in the theory of world government.

World Governmentalists

Emery Reves, a prominent world governmentalist, has argued that the world as divided into nation states would inevitably be disorderly and war would be the ultimate means to solve differences among the nation states. Whereas historical forces such as international economic interdependence require global cooperation, the humanity has been trying to solve economic and social problems in a system of states divided by clear boundaries. The result is being the human misery and the deprivation of individual autonomy for the sake of national power. Therefore, Reves rejected **the internationalist approach** to order and criticized the systems of both the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN). He was convinced that "at the present stage of industrial development, there can be no freedom under the system of sovereign nation-states" (Reves, 1945: 163).

In fact, looking from a broader historical perspective, Reves thought that war has occurred wherever and whenever political units of equal sovereignty have faced each other. The solution to the problem of war, then, would be "integrating the warring units into a higher sovereignty." This higher sovereignty, or **world government**, would be provided with legislative, judicial, and executive powers, as the result being "a legal order within which all peoples may enjoy equal security, equal obligation and equal rights under law." Reves believed that if such a higher authority proves impossible to be created by the consent of nation states, *conquest* would be permissible. "If we cannot attain to universalism and create union by common consent and democratic methods as a result of rational thinking," he concluded, "then rather than retard the process, let us precipitate unification by conquest" (Reves, 1945: 122, 125, 269).

Soon after the launching of the first atomic bomb, a group of scientists at Oak Ridge issued a statement recommending that nuclear power be entrusted to a World Security Council authorized by all the world's states to inspect their scientific, technical, industrial and military installations and they called for full publicity for all scientific and technological breakthroughs. In September 1945 Emery Reves informed Einstein about this statement and added that, in his opinion, these recommendations showed that scientists "have not thought the political problem through and still abide by old-fashioned internationalism, believing a league of sovereign nation-states capable of maintaining peace between its member states. There is only one way to prevent an atomic war and that is to prevent war. Analyzing all the wars of history, I think it is possible to define the one and only condition in human society that produces war. This is the non-integrated coexistence of sovereign powers. Peace is law. Peace between warring sovereign social units can be achieved only by the integration of these conflicting into a higher sovereignty by the creation of a world government. No group of people today have such influence on the public as do the nuclear physicists. Their responsibility in making political suggestions is tremendous. They should always keep in mind the fundamental thesis Hamilton expressed in The Federalist: 'To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages'."
(From a letter from E. Reves to Einstein, published in O. Nathan, H. Norden, Einstein on Peace, Avenel Books, New York, 1981, pp. 337-338) (www.thefederalist.eu).



Figure 2.1 Emery Reves with Winston Churchill

Source: The College of William & Mary, www.wm.edu

Similarly, **Cord Meyer**, another prominent world governmentalist, has argued that the nation-state was responsible for two world wars within a generation. "As long as the inhabitants of the earth prefer to live as members of sovereign states," he wrote, "the catastrophe of war will remain the ultimate means of settling their disputes and of protecting their rights and very existence" (Meyer, 1947: 9). Meyer did not observe any change in politicians' basic approach to world order after the Second World War, and therefore argued that national economies were still in the service of war machine and continued to deprive individuals of their autonomy.

Meyer urged that **peace-through-power** reasoning is wrong and that the internationalist approach, which fails to transform this reasoning, should be discarded. Meyer's "plan for survival" was turning the UN system into a world government. In this new system he suggested that "the power to legislate should be given to the General Assembly. The Council must be constructed as an executive commission or cabinet. There must be erected a system of U.N. courts with compulsory jurisdiction over individuals in all cases arising under the world laws. [And] the U.N. police must be armed with modern weapons." Meyer argued that only in such a system will individuals "find for the first time the freedom from fear." However, he had second thoughts about the possibility that national leaders would let this system to get realized. Therefore, he argued that "the initiative must come from the people" (Meyer, 1947: 161-170, 175, 211).

Many IR scholars have in fact subscribed to this proposal to world order. Even Hans Morgenthau seems to have suggested that, if realized, a world government would be a solution, and in fact a good solution, to the problem of war and peace. In *Politics Among Nations,* Morgenthau wrote as follows: "There is no shirking the conclusion that in no period of modern history was civilization more in need of permanent peace and hence, of a world state" (Morgenthau, 1978: 503). Similarly, Georg Schwarzenberger has argued that "the federal world state is the only complete alternative to world power politics" (Schwarzenberger, 1964: 530).




Figure 2.2 World Federalist Cord Meyer and Albert Einstein in conversation, Princeton N.J.

Source: International Center of Photography, www.icp.org

Criticism of the World Government Approach

From a liberal perspective, however, world government may not be a sound proposal to world order. Its argument that the individual will enjoy freedom under a world government is dubious. A single government at the international level can hardly be conducive to the enjoyment of individual freedom, nor is it conducive to the promotion of community values. It is also in direct confrontation with a liberal pragmatic way of establishing the desired order through pluralistic means by a slow process. The question of "how we will get there from here" has not been deeply thought by the world governmentalists; and as this question has been answered so far, it has a *utopian* character either by the consent, by conquest, or by the people's initiative.

In an attempt to explain these criticisms, let us elaborate on the domestic analogy of the world governmentalists. We can in fact single out three major flaws in their analogy: a) order is the product of the sheer existence of government; b) order is the product of the monopoly of power; c) order is the product of the enforcement of law on individuals.

Associating domestic order with the existence of a government may be flawed. Therefore, the domestic analogy of the world governmentalists that international order can be sustained and promoted by the creation of a single government at the global level may be fallacious. The world governmentalists may have exaggerated the level of order in domestic politics. Civil wars, revolutions, and mob violence would suffice to demonstrate that order at the domestic level is far from being secured by the sheer existence of a government. Moreover, creating a world government may not be the right solution to the problem of war and peace, because the world, in fact, is more orderly than world governmentalists have assumed. Put differently, they may have not only exaggerated the orderliness of the domestic realm but also the disorderliness of the international realm. Like Realists, world governmentalists believe that anarchy is the only rule around- that the system is in a Hobbesian state of nature, *a war of all against all.*

The second flaw in world governmentalists' domestic analogy has been the derivative of their first assumption. They not only have thought that government sustains order but also that it is the government's having the *monopoly of power* which basically sustains order in domestic politics. For one thing, government does not in the first place have a monopoly of power. This is clear from incidents such as civil wars, riots, rebellions, and government coups. For another, it is not the power to which we owe domestic order. Rather than coercing individuals in a society to a specific way of behavior, order refers to the management of their relations through peaceful political means. Even if the government does, and have to, resort to physical coercion in some cases, this does not mean that government sustains order mainly through this function.

Finally, another flaw in world governmentalists' analogy may be the idea that domestic order has been sustained by governments through *the enforcement of law on individuals* and so world order could be sustained by the imposing of global laws on citizens of the new world. This was, in fact, the logical conclusion of world governmentalists' plan of dismantling the state as the main political institution. This analogy may be flawed though. First, one can argue that it is not the function of law but political management in the first place what makes the society orderly at the domestic level. Secondly, one can also argue that it is not individuals but **collectivities** have had the potential of causing disorder in domestic life. Civil wars, secessionist movements, terrorist activities, ideological conflicts and the like within states have indicated that domestic order has something to do with managing relationships among collectivities rather than enforcing law on individuals. Therefore, world governmentalists may have overlooked or underestimated the role of collectivities in domestic politics and that the concern of any proposal to order should be controlling the behavior of "units" at the international level (Claude, 1952).



your turn [1]

Discuss the premises of major IR theories on "sovereignty" and the place of the state in world politics.

LEGALISM

The concept of **legalism** refers to a world-order approach that considers *international law as the exclusive means to sustaining and promoting world order*. Although the endproduct of its proponents has been a world government or world federalism, they however, acknowledging the difficulty involved in this process, have generally entertained the idea that world government may be created by first establishing a world confederal structure. Federalism and Confederalism, so the argument goes, would and should be achieved by uniting the world around **a common global law**. A general international organization, more specifically the UN, would be given the right and the capability to enforce international rules on the states and to bring any international discussion to the World Court.

Proponents of Legalism

One proponent of legalism has been **Hans Kelsen**. In *Peace Through Law*, which was published toward the end of the Second World War, Kelsen argued that if the big powers were satisfied in their territorial claims, then following the war they could agree on a legalistic scheme for order. For the endproduct of that scheme, he stated that "it is quite possible that the idea of a universal World Federal State will be realized. Obviously, [however] at first only an international union of states, not a federal state could be set up. That means that the solution of the problem of a durable peace can be sought only within the framework of international law."

"Kelsen introduces the central idea of the international court. But for this to be efficacious, he adds, it is necessary that all conflicts between states can be brought back in the final instance to a legal dispute, and thus that the distinction between legal and political conflicts is abolished (a distinction based exclusively on discretional criteria of the states themselves, which invoke one or the other principle on the basis of their own interest); in this way, any dispute between states is subject to the authority of the international court. It is further necessary that, in addition to the collective responsibilities of a state, the court can also prosecute individual responsibilities of those who, having government office, commit, order, or authorize acts of war which violate international law (which derives, in substance, from the principle of bellum justum).

The most delicate point, of which Kelsen is well aware, concerns the execution of the court's decisions regarding states. It is clear that the most efficacious method to enforce the orders and judgements of the Court would be to have a centralized executive power, i.e. an international police force independent of the armies of the states and directly at the disposal of a central administrative agency charged with executing the decisions of the court. But 'an international police force is effective only if based on the obligation of the member states to disarm or radically to limit their own armament, so that solely the League is permitted to maintain an armed force of considerable strength. A police force of this kind is 'international' only with respect to its legal basis, the international treaty. It is, however, 'national' with respect to the degree of its centralization, for a League with a centralized executive power is no longer an international confederacy of states, but a state itself' (Kelsen, 1944: 19). An 'international' police force of this type is therefore a radical limitation, if not a total destruction, of the sovereignty of the state, and in the current phase it is unthinkable. The creation of a central executive power is the most difficult problem, from the point of view of world organization, and it therefore cannot be the first step.

The solution then is to be sought by resorting to the armed forces of the states which must provide them directly to the Council charged with executing the court's decisions. According to Kelsen, this solution is in any case effective, because the very fact of establishing an International Court is a decisive step towards the creation of a World federal state: 'The problem of world organization is a problem of centralization; and the whole evolution of the law from its primitive beginnings to its standard of today has been, from a technical point of view, a continuous process of centralization....The centralization of the executive power is the last step...from the decentralized pre-state community to the centralized community we call state. We have good reasons to believe that international law — that is, the law of inter-state community, completely decentralized and dominated by the principle of self-help — develops in the same way as the primitive law of the pre-state community. If it is true, we can with a certain degree of probability foresee the direction in which a relatively successful attempt may be undertaken to secure international peace, to eliminate the principle of self-help from international law by emphasizing and strengthening the given tendency toward centralization. Natural evolution tends first toward international judiciary and not toward international government or legislation' (Kelsen, 1944: 22). These quotations from Kelsen represent one of the most coherent and best argued reflections on the relationship between the establishment of the international court and the process towards the World federation" (www.thefederalist.eu).

Kelsen related the failure of the League of Nations to its founding fathers' placing the Council at the center of the organization rather than the Permanent Court of International Justice. He therefore argued that in this new order it would be "the obligation of the Member States to submit all their disputes without exception to the compulsory jurisdiction of an international court" (Kelsen, 1944: 12, 56).

Once Kelsen's dream faded away, some scholars entertained the question of how the new universal organization, the United Nations, could be turned into a legal system. For example, **Greenville Clark** and **Louis Sohn** have developed in their co-authored book, *World Peace Through World Law*, the idea that the issues related to the maintenance of peace should be exclusively dealt by the United Nations. The UN would have its own enforcement capability and two kinds of court (the International Court of Justice –ICJ- and the World Equity Tribunal), each with compulsory jurisdiction. The organization might even be transformed into a closer union among the member states; they wrote: "If we can accomplish that, we should feel satisfied and could well leave to later generations any enlargement of the powers of the world organization that they might find desirable" (Clark and Sohn, 1966: xvii).




Figure 2.3 Grenville Clark in Dublin, New Hampshire, c.1937.

Source: www.harvardsquarelibrary.org

Criticism of the Legalist Approach

Some scholars, however, argued against the legalist approach. First, the domestic analogy of legalists may be flawed, because, especially from a liberal perspective, order refers to the political management of group relations rather than either law making or enforcing the law on individuals or nations. Legalists' starting point has been the domestic analogy, but they too have somewhat mistaken the role of the government in domestic politics.

Secondly, from a pragmatic perspective, one should ask the question what this world order, if realized at all, would mean for the individual's life and for the nations' future. Pragmatism looks at the consequences (to the "fruits") of a certain rule for action. Imagine a world where individuals and other entities in the world would act only according to the rules established by an authority. This would not be an order at all for peoples who would like to live in a world where they feel free so as to pursue their own truths, beliefs, and dreams. There may be a certain disbelief in the potentiality of human beings in this legalistic proposal- a certain fear from the future, so that everything should be managed by the threat of punishment. This is a liberal way of approaching to neither human relations nor to political government.

Legalism, moreover, may perpetuate a dogmatic and static world order. For one thing, there is dogmatism in the legal approach in that it believes the law would create an orderly system no matter what, and solve every conflict at the international level. This is, in fact, a combination of the *a priori* method and the *method of authority* for settling opinions. Nations are obliged in this scheme to submit to the law made by the UN and take their cases to the ICJ. An authority's making the law and enforcing the rule of compulsory jurisdiction in the system conflicts with the pragmatic liberal belief in the method of solving problems by voluntaristic means, comparing the relative workability and effectiveness of different methods, and discarding those that do not work.

For another, law's static nature conflicts with notions such as evolution and change. Individuals should adapt to the environmental changes as well as try to make changes in the environment so as to better their conditions in the system. However, law can be considered as something static, especially at the international level- where there does not exist an authority that would make changes in that law as the political milieu changes. Since international law involves national interests, and since that

existing law attempts to define not only what law is but also what law should be in the future, the politician may not want to subscribe to a static understanding of order or to agree to take every dispute to the World Court.



Figure 2.4 Scale of justice

Because of this dogmatic and static nature of law, some scholars argue that politics is a better means than law in sustaining and promoting order. Again, at the domestic level, one can consider the role of the government as the application of political means to manage relations among groups and improve the workings of political means. Applying this understanding to international politics, political means, rather than a common global law, may better serve to the objective of a more orderly world.

Legalism, then, has been criticized on the grounds of the nature of its world order and the means to creating and promoting that order. From the perspective of its critics, the endproduct of legalism may be a world government. Moreover, instead of relatively flexible means that would take into account the pluralistic nature of the world and the freedom of both the individual and nations to define and pursue what order should be at every level of social life, legalism is criticized to have a dogmatic and static understanding of means. It is, in other words, a **top-down method** for managing world affairs rather than something created by consensus, compromise, and adjustment through political processes. As opposed to legalists, many scholars have argued for the application of *political* means at the international level- means such as a balance of power modified by international institutions, international organizations, great power management, and international leadership.

your turn 2

Discuss the position of major IR theories on values, norms, and justice.

FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism, as another Idealist proposal for world order, argues for the organization of international cooperation not along the line of territoriality but of specific social and economic activities. It stresses *cooperative nature of world politics* rather than international conflicts and, as such, addresses the problem of war and peace indirectly. The assumption here is that cooperation in economic and social activities would gradually help states to achieve mutual understanding and solve their differences, that is, cooperation in nonpolitical issues would "spill over" to political issues.

One ardent supporter of functionalism has been **David Mitrany**. In his authoritative work, *A Working Peace System*, Mitrany argues that the world has become so "closely interrelated," that one issue in one part of the world has been affecting other peoples living in other parts of the world. This suggests in fact that human beings have become "one indivisible community" (Mitrany, 1966: 13 and 37). Meeting the needs of this community, according to Mitrany, requires a different approach than we have now- the territorial organization of the world by nation-states. However, nation-states, so the argument goes, are reluctant to give up their sovereignty.

Mitrany therefore argues that states should transfer their sovereignty in specific issues to an international organization. "Under this idea," he writes, "it is not a matter of surrendering sovereignty but merely of pooling as much of it as may be needed for the joint performance of a particular task" (Mitrany, 1966: 163). The concern here then will not be "by whom" the power will be exercised but "upon what objects" that power will be used. Mitrany goes on to explain that this approach will help make the necessary changes in international relations to adapt institutions to the environmental conditions. The old diplomatic tactic of making frontier changes, then, will not suffice any more to serve this end. "The only

sound sense of peaceful change," Mitrany writes, "is to do internationally what it does nationally: to make changes of frontiers unnecessary by making frontiers meaningless through the continuous development of common activities and interests across them. The true task of peaceful change is to remove the need and the wish for changes of frontiers" (Mitrany, 1966: 62).

Mitrany argues against federalism because it prevents international cooperation from going beyond the definitions set forth in its constitution. "It is too often overlooked," he writes, "that written constitutions have in the main served as a check to authority; and federal constitutions, while they serve to bind, also serve to divide." However, a close reading of Mitrany would demonstrate that he might not oppose the idea of world government or world federalism but its overnight establishment with a blue print.

David Mitrany worked towards the development of effective peace organizations. At the outbreak of the Second World War, Mitrany became a member of the (British) Foreign Office's academic intelligence unit, and as early as June 1941 was setting out an "Agenda of peace making." In another paper, "Territorial, ideological, or functional organization?" he expanded his own ideas, and at the end of 1942 he resigned to pursue these further. The results appeared in a pamphlet, A Working Peace System (1943), which had an immediate public appeal and was translated into various languages. Mitrany embarked on an extensive program of lecturing, broadcasting, and writing, with the aim of ensuring that a new peace organization would not be handicapped by a rigid constitution (as had the League of Nations) but would be given the capacity to develop on functional and sociological lines. The validity of the functional approach was accepted and incorporated in the founding documents of the specialized agencies of the new United Nations (The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, quoted at www.ias.edu/scholars/david-mitrany).

A gradual creation of world federalism by the erosion of national frontiers through functional cooperation is what Mitrany has been arguing. "The functional arrangements," he asserts, "might indeed be regarded as organic elements of a *federalism by installments*." He has written also that "if the [functional] organizations are successful and their number grows, world government will gradually evolve through their performance" (Mitrany, 1966: 32, 83, 163).

Neofunctionalism, one version of functionalism, has been mainly applied to the European integration process. Since the mid-1950s, scholars looking at the European example have argued that in fact the application of functional theory at the regional level may eventually create a peaceful world. If each region in the world were peaceful, then, we would have perpetual peace at the global level. Neofunctionalism as such has been introduced as the idea of "**peace in parts**."

More than any other scholar, **Ernst B. Haas** deserves to be known as *the founding father* of neofunctionalism. Haas has developed the idea of regional integration through functional cooperation on 'nonpolitical' issues, which would in fact lead to further integration in the geographical area concerned. However, even Haas himself had second thoughts right from the beginning of his studies about both the soundness of this "spill over" theory and neofunctionalism as a promising way to world peace.

Haas acknowledged that the European experience may not be reproduced in other parts of the world simply because some "necessary preconditions" such as economic development and industrial potential have been missing. "Other regions with strongly varying environmental factors," he argued, "are unlikely to imitate successfully the European example." Haas even acknowledged that regional integration might pose a threat to global peace. "Regional integration," he wrote, "may eventually slow down universal integration altogether. The regional process may create a relatively small number of integrated political communities, facing each other in the UN system" (Haas, 1961: 389, 391-392). In fact, Haas has totally distanced himself from the neofunctionalist approach in mid-1970s. "Regional integration theories are obsolete in Western Europe," he concluded, "and obsolescent in the rest of the world" (Haas, 1975: 1).




Figure 2.5 One of Haas's seminal works, Beyond the Nation-State, originally published in 1964.

Source: www.google.com.tr

Criticism of the Functionalist Approach

Let us turn our attention to the criticism of the functional approach to world order. First, functionalism has been criticized because it assumes that war is the result of economic and social backwardness. According to the functionalist reasoning, the problem of war and peace may be solved by the indirect approach of first solving economic and social problems through functional cooperation among governments. However, "the recent history of the world clearly fails to confirm the existence of a direct correlation between national economic backwardness and aggressiveness; it was advanced Germans, not primitive Africans, who shattered world peace in 1939" (Claude, 1971: 387-388).

Second, scholars have criticized functionalism because of its **separability** assumption - the assumption that we can separate political issues from nonpolitical issues. Functionalism holds that states should first start cooperating on nonpolitical issues- which are mainly technical, economic and social- because they do not directly affect the state sovereignty, or affect it to the extent that political issues do. However, one may not really divide the governmental functions into two groups as political and nonpolitical. In fact, if the functionalist argument were the case, the government's role would be much easier. Third, even if we can assume that political and nonpolitical issues can be separable, this does not demonstrate that priority should be given to cooperation in nonpolitical issues.

Fourth, related to the previous point, even if we may be able to both separate political from nonpolitical issues and give priority to the latter, this does not mean, however, that we can solve political problems in this way- that we can achieve world order through a functional cooperation among states. This is, in fact, where scholars criticize functionalists' *means* to sustain and promote world order. Functionalists have advocated that the functional approach is pragmatic; however, one may argue that by believing in a single formula, that cooperation in economic and social issues will lead to world peace, functionalists have not adopted the pluralistic, eclectic approach of pragmatism to solving problems at any level of social life.

Fifth, one can also argue that the functionalist approach is biased against the state. Yet the state fulfills critical functions in the system. Being anti-state does not solve the question of what kind of problems particular states may create and how, through which institutional arrangements, the other states may solve these problems. The functionalist approach is said to have disregarded both the existence of hard political problems in the system and the fact that the state is still the major actor in international politics. The state not only gives reasonable security to specific groups, but also culturally defines them, that is, it gives them an identity. The state is not only composed of functional, economic, and political spheres, but of moral values and a specific culture. A functional world order therefore, even if it is possible, may not be desirable.

Finally, scholars have criticized functionalists on the grounds that they have the wishful thinking that by working on economic and social issues they would address the problem of war and peace. As such, functionalists may have also disregarded the role of power in international life; however, war is a reality of international relations and power is one of the critical means to solve problems at any level of social life.

These criticisms on functionalism equally apply to its neofunctionalist version. Moreover, many scholars argue that regional and global organizations may not necessarily be mutually exclusive. Rather than being dogmatic and promoting international organization at one level, we should think how to profit from both regional and global institutions. For example, the UN may be better suited to address the question of war and peace whereas regional institutions to promote cooperation among certain countries, which already have good relations and the potential for further integration.



your turn 3

Toward creating a relatively orderly and peaceful world, discuss the relationship between the individual and the structure. In your discussion, touch on the assumptions of the major IR theories on universal values and domestic forces such as the political regime.

COSMOPOLITANISM

Starting with the early 1970s some world-order scholars have come to be known as **cosmopolitanists**. These scholars have had such common views on international relations:

- Environmental conditions pose a threat to order. As a result, the state has become obsolete as a political organization and it should be modified and preferably transformed in the long run;
- A specific understanding of justice, "distributive justice," should be achieved at the global level;
- A global community is on the rise and that community would help achieve distributive justice;
- In this process many new institutions both above and below the state level would be necessary to establish.

Cosmopolitanists

The domestic analogy of cosmopolitanists is that- since the domestic realm is somewhat orderly because of the existence of a community and that the state sustains order through distributive justice- we can create a more orderly world by establishing **a global community** and achieving **distributive justice** at the international level.

The most authoritative work on the cosmopolitan morality has arguably been Charles Beitz's *Political Theory and International Relations*. **Charles Beitz** criticized the Hobbesian or Realist morality that he calls "**international skepticism**" as well as the legalists' understanding of morality, that is, "**the morality of state**." According to Beitz, the creation of an international morality is within the reach of humanity unlike what Realists believe, and this international morality can transcend the statist approach to politics unlike what legalists think. His starting point for the cosmopolitan argument has been the idea that "the international realm is coming more and more to resemble domestic society in many of the features usually thought relevant to the justification of domestic political principles." States, for example, have become so *interdependent* through economic intercourse that the relationship among them cannot any more be sustained by an understanding of international aid as only "charity." Beitz has argued that "the existing global distribution of income and wealth is highly unjust," and held that we are to realize "international distributive justice that establish a fair division of natural resources, income and wealth among persons situated in diverse national societies" (Beitz, 1979: 7-8, 9 and 179).



Figure 2.6 Charles Beitz, currently professor of politics at Princeton University.

Source: Stanford University, www.fsi.stanford.edu

A specific group of scholars known as **World-Order-Models-Project (WOMP) scholars** (such as Richard Falk, Rajni Kothari, Ali Mazrui, and Gustavo Lagos) have both elaborated on this morality and given specific cosmopolitan proposals for a more orderly world. Though they come from different backgrounds (Falk is North American, Kothari Indian, Mazrui Arabic-African, and Lagos Latin American), they have shared some specific global values such as individual autonomy, nonviolence, democratic participation, economic welfare, cultural integration, social justice, ecological balance, and peace.

The underlying philosophy of the World Order Models Project (known affectionately as WOMP), was that world peace could not be created by any one nation. Instead, an "acceptable design for world order [must] be the product of contributions from many nations." WOMP sought out new models of world order that would form the basis of an international dialogue to address the question of what world order values ought to be (by Amanda Dugan at www.worldpolicy.org).

They have also believed that the state system is far from realizing these values. Therefore, Richard Falk, for example, argued that "drastic global reform has become a *realistic* substitute for romantic adherence to the outmoded patterns of thought and action associated with balance of power statecraft. In other words, the new utopians are the old realists, and vice versa" (Falk, 1976: 47).

Criticism of Cosmopolitanism

Some scholars consider cosmopolitanism an improvement over world federalism. Basically because cosmopolitanism is not that naïve to hold that the absence of violence would itself bring about an orderly world and that order can be achieved without addressing social issues. However, cosmopolitanism has not been able to escape scholarly criticism.

Cosmopolitanists have argued that the state and the state-centric political view have lost their "normative relevance" because of economic, social, technological, and environmental changes taking place in the world, and so a new system of world order, other than a state-system, should be established. Yet, as we have discussed above, the state still fulfills critical functions. The second criticism leveled against the cosmopolitan approach is the cosmopolitanists' notion of *distributive justice.* A social order undoubtedly requires an understanding of distributive justice. However, it may be wrong to think that this understanding can be easily applied to the global level. For one thing, we have not reached a consensus on the definition of justice even at the domestic level. For another, if not in all societies, in most societies distributive justice is yet to be achieved. It is wrong to assume then that it is distributive justice what makes the domestic realm orderly so that we should apply it to the global level. In fact, even Beitz has neither given a definition of justice nor established the soundness of his domestic analogy. "A complete normative theory of international relations," Beitz argued, "would require an account of domestic social justice, but I cannot provide such an account in this book. The most obvious reason is that the subject of social justice raises complex and persistent philosophical problems, which deserve far more extensive exploration than space and time allow" (Beitz, 1979: 122).

The economic, political, and social frameworks that each society has—its laws, institutions, policies, etc.—result in different distributions of benefits and burdens across members of the society. These frameworks are the result of human political processes and they constantly change both across societies and within societies over time. The structure of these frameworks is important because the distributions of benefits and burdens resulting from them fundamentally affect people's lives. Arguments about which frameworks and/or resulting distributions are morally preferable constitute the topic of distributive justice. Principles of distributive justice are therefore best thought of as providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies, and any principles that do offer this kind of moral guidance on distribution, regardless of the terminology they employ, should be considered principles of distributive justice (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/).

Another criticism that should be leveled against the cosmopolitanism's distributive justice principle is that a global definition of justice, without necessary conditions that would help bring individuals and nations together, would require an excessively powerful central authority that would apply- in fact, impose and enforce- that justice. However, this may contradict the notion of individual freedom. Moreover, the world is still without such a central authority. The UN cannot be considered as an organization that could turn into a world government to impose international rules, nor do the members of the UN demand such a central authority.

Third, cosmopolitanism's domestic analogy may also be flawed because it considers domestic order the result of the existence of *a* national community. Yet there is no such *one* community at the domestic level on which order is based. For many scholars, order at the domestic level results from the government's sensitivity to the political management of relations of diverse communities within the society. In other words, order may refer to *managed pluralism*. Even if cosmopolitanist scholars have been arguing that the world community, though does not exist now, will gradually arise through such historical forces as modernization, economic interdependence, or globalization, this may not happen at all or, in fact, these historical forces may be counter-productive.

Toward sustaining and promoting world order, we should maybe devise political means so as to manage complex relations among nations rather than wishing to create a single global community that would give way to a lasting peace. World order may be promoted not by an understanding of global community but by improving the relations between nations so as to help solve their differences without resorting to force. Cosmopolitanists have the analogy that world order could be created through establishing a system of distributive justice that would grow parallel to the establishment and strengthening of a global community. However, both the *analogy of distributive justice* and *the analogy of community* may be flawed. Even if we assume for a moment that cosmopolitanists are correct in their analogy, such a cosmopolitan world *may not be desirable* either. Cosmopolitanists' world would not only lump together all the existing values and cultures in the world but also create a central agency that makes the transformation of that system, even any change within that system, unthinkable.

As specific world-order proposals, so far we have elaborated on world government, legalism, functionalism, and cosmopolitanism. Next, we will turn our attention to two other proposals that in fact have applied in world politics: collective security and the balance of power.



your turn 4

Discuss Kant's understanding of "Perpetual Peace." According to Kant, what are the prerequisites for creating perpetual peace?

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER AS SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING POWER RELATIONS

Both collective security and the balance of power are, in fact, specific means to managing power relations in international politics. Here we use the concept of "power" in the sense of **military power.** As we touched on the concept of order above, *order* in narrow sense refers to the absence of war in the system, and the concept on which scholars have elaborated for achieving that kind of order is **the management of power**. Given that the concept of power will be used in its narrow sense here (rather than as a social order), the management of power, then, refers to *the endeavor to make it unnecessary and less likely to resort to military power or to use force in the international system*.

Collective Security

Collective security is a **partially centralized system** in that the possession of power remains diffused among states, but at the same time the use of force in the system is regulated by a central agency such as an international organization with a universal membership. In fact, "collective security is the name given by the planners of a new world order after World War I to the system for maintenance of international peace that they intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power" (Claude, 1971: 247). The balance

of power, on the other hand, is a **decentralized system** for managing power relations.

In order to determine what collective security means, it would be helpful to go back to the end of the First World War and pay attention to the definition of this concept by political leaders and scholars of the League of Nations era. The US President Woodrow Wilson used the concept of collective security consistently as a system for the management of power in international relations. When we look at the works of scholars of the League era, whom we generally call **Idealists**, we can see that they also used collective security as *an alternative system* to the balance of power.

James T. Shotwell, for example, believed that collective security would help replace states' resort to force for political means. "Since war no longer offered a 'rational' solution to international grievances, Shotwell suggested that peaceful substitutes be found. The major problem was to guarantee that no nation resorted to war to achieve its goals. To accomplish this, he urged the creation of a deterrent to aggression through an effective collective security system" (Josephson, 1975: 157).

James T. Shotwell, Bryce Professor of the History of International Relations at Columbia University, devoted most of his life, as he put it, "to the organization of peace." Considering the period his life spanned — he died at 90 in 1965, having studied and taught at Columbia for nearly 50 years — this was no small project. He was present at, indeed instrumental in, the creation of some of the most important international institutions of the twentieth century. He believed that his was the beginning of a new era, a time in which rapid technological advances demanded new conceptions of how states resolved their differences. He argued that in the modern world peace is not merely the absence of war but something that needs to be planned and organized. He did all he could to encourage that organization, and in doing so he helped provoke an entirely new academic field — international relations — and proposed many of the policies and instruments by which governments today approach management of their common affairs

(Columbia University; www.columbia.edu).

Similarly, **Gilbert Murray** thought that the "old system" contributed to the Great War and so it had to be replaced by something "better." Murray argued that "the war occurred, not because certain individuals were wicked, but because the international system was wrong. Out of that disaster arose inevitably the demand that, when once the war was over, the system should be changed" (Murray, 1929: 67-68).



Figure 2.7 Nicholas M. Butler, a Nobel Peace laureate

Source: www.nobelprize.org

Nicholas M. Butler too argued for a new system for managing power in international relations; he asserted that "where in relations force is used, it should be only the collective force of an organized society of nations serving as police power to repress or, when necessary, to punish the law-breaker in the ranks of that organized society of nations" (Butler, 1940: 196). Similarly, for **Alfred Zimmern**, collective security was a new system for managing power, a system that he defined as "the safety of all by all" (Zimmern, 1936: 4).

To understand how this system of collective security functions in a way to sustain order, we should turn to a more specific definition of the concept. Such a definition, as given and used by scholars and statesmen of the League era, refers to a system that involves "the establishment and operation of a complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanisms designed to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state, by presenting to

potential aggressors the incredible threat and to potential victims of aggression the reliable promise of effective collective measures, ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions, to enforce peace" (Claude, 1971: 247). Elaborating on this definition of collective security will help compare and contrast collective security and the balance of power as systems for managing power.

First, collective security prescribes a partially centralized system for the management of power. Although, states still possess the means of power, resort to force is regulated by a central agency, which is a general international organization such as the League of Nations or the United Nations. Second, in this agenda, aggression would be deterred not by an equilibrium of power but by a **preponderance**. As such, collective security holds that most, if not all, states must remain committed to the system to deter the potential aggressor, and, when needed, participate in collective actions to punish the aggressor. Third, although collective security prescribes imposing on the aggressor moral, diplomatic, and economic sanctions, its credibility as a deterrent relies ultimately on *military sanction*. Therefore, collective security is a **hard approach** to world order (Claude, 1986: 56). Because it requires willingness to support the words with deeds and a determination to frustrate and, if necessary, defeat the aggressor with military sanction. Fourth, collective security is a **"one for all, all for one"** scheme in that states are believed to be committed to deter and punish the aggressor, regardless of their own identities and the aggressor's identity. Put differently, states are supposed not to discriminate between friends and foes. Finally, related to the fourth point, collective security opposes the alliance-building policy, and it rather prescribes **a universal alliance**.

In short, collective security insists on states to give up their traditional policies such as discriminating between aggressions and aggressors, resorting to the use of force at their own discretion, and acting in a way to protect and promote their own interests. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is the closest example of a collective security with automatic response to the attack on one of the member states. Article 10 reads as follows: "The Members of the League *undertake to respect and preserve* as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

The Balance of Power

The most-often-used concept in the field of international relations is arguably the **balance of power**. Yet scholars have not agreed on a single definition of the concept, nor have they been consistent in using their own definitions. The balance of power have been used by scholars in various meanings such as equilibrium, disequilibrium, distribution of power, policy and, in fact, as a symbol of the Realist school of international relations.

However, the balance of power, as a medium for the discussion on the management of power, should be understood exclusively as a **system**- "a system within which independent states operate autonomously, without the controlling direction of a superior agency, to manipulate power relationships among themselves. It is thus a decidedly decentralized system; power and policy remain in the hands of its constituent units" (Claude, 1962: 88).

There are two ideas on the balance of power as a system that deserve attention. First, the balance of power is a "**fallback system**" of international relations; in a multistate system, unless an alternate system is established for the management of power, it is natural for states to take care of their own security. Put differently, "the balance system *is* the natural international system in the sense that it does not have to be contrived. In the absence of a different system, states fall back on this one" (Claude, 1990: 35). Secondly, "the contemporary balance of power system is by no means a mere duplicate of systems which have existed in the past" (Claude, 1962: 281). The classical balance system of the earlier centuries has been modified by two major developments in this century; first, the establishment of general international organizations and, second, by institutionalized alliances such as NATO. Then, the system that we have had for the management of power since the establishment of the League of Nations may be called a "**modified balance of power system.**"

The precise objectives of balance of power system have been a controversy among the scholars of international relations. Objectives of (or benefits of, or the results to be expected from) a successfully operating balance of power system have been argued to be either peace, order, stability, moderation, preserving the independence of states, preserving the integrity of the multistate system, or some combination of these.

In fact, the first and foremost *objective* of the system is creating and preserving an **approximate equilibrium of power** among states; only within such a power configuration can we expect to have order and stability in the system and to ensure the survival of states and the multistate system. Considering an equilibrium of power, the primary objective of the system helps us to reconcile the arguments of balance of power theorists. From this perspective, for example, there is not a major difference of view between scholars who hold that the system's objective is not to prevent war and those who do so.

Some scholars, however, have thought that not an equilibrium but a **preponderance of power** would achieve statesmen's objectives in the system. Especially Realists have developed the theory of **hegemonic stability**, which holds that only a militarily and economically powerful state can provide and sustain order in the system and so the existence of a hegemon and the effort to become a hegemon in the system do not necessarily provoke a war. The identity of the preponderant power may be a significant determinant of the attitudes of states in the international system and that preponderance, not equilibrium, may serve the stability and peace in the system if a benign power acts as the hegemon. However, given the two world wars, there are many good reasons to be skeptical of the utility of preponderance and of the role of hegemons in the system.

As for *the means* of the balance of power system, states try to prevent other states from achieving preponderance in the system by two means: first, building their own power through means such as armaments (**internal balancing**) and, second, establishing alliances (**external balancing**). "From time to time, some state or group of states moves toward becoming preponderant. Other states see this as a threat to their own security and to the stability of the system as a whole. Therefore, they build their strength and unite in alliances so as to counter the threat. This pattern might be described as the instinctive behavior of rational persons entrusted with the government of states. It is a matter of states 'doing what comes naturally'" (Claude, 1990: 34).

Has the Collective Security System Been Rejected?

Some scholars argue that collective security has been rejected as an approach to the management of power. Obviously, there has been no system of collective security in place since 1945. It is also true that the multilateral intervention in Korea and Iraq occurred; however, these were instances of *collective reaction* to an aggressor when and where the intervening nations' interests converged, rather than actions done within a system of collective security. From this perspective, the stability in the system since 1945 has been sustained not by collective security but rather by *a balancing process*, through both alliances and armaments, and by the existence of international organizations that have contributed to that process.

For example Claude argues that the idea of collective security is "almost universally and quite definitively rejected" (Claude, 1986: 51). Collective security has been rejected because of the absence of objective and subjective requirements in the international system that are necessary for the adoption and effective working of collective security.



Figure 2.8 Inis L. Claude, Jr.,

Source: Hendrix College, www.hendrix.edu

Objective requirements refer to the specific security environment that the theory of collective security envisages. According to the collective security scheme, an attack in the system against any state will trigger the combined resistance of all other states. It is, in other words, a scheme of '**all against one**;' a scheme for creating a preponderance of power against the aggressor. Nevertheless, the existing security environment may not be conducive to follow such a principle in the international system at least for two reasons: *the thermonuclear revolution* and *the grouping of states along ideological lines*.

First, the thermonuclear revolution rendered it impossible to create a preponderance of power in case of an attack committed by *a great power*. Second, the collective security scheme envisages creating a preponderance of power against the aggressor, regardless of its identity, and a system in which the "lonely" aggressor will be punished by most, if not all, states. Nevertheless, more often than not, the identity of states determines the characteristics of the groupings among states and as such hardly any state is left without a group in the system, making it impossible to create a preponderance of power and so to impose collective sanctions against the aggressor, whether a minor or a major power.

We can explain this phenomenon during the Cold War with the concept of **bipolarization**. The emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers and as the leaders of the two competing blocs created a security environment that conflicted with the major assumptions of collective security. Although the end of the Cold War brought about the demise of the bipolar world, ideological and political grouping among states is hardly over. First of all, Russia has kept its Asian empire and we have been observing a regrouping among Russia and other Slavic states. Secondly, NATO is determined to hold together the Western allies, and, in fact, it expanded so as to include the Central and Eastern European countries as well as the Baltic states. Finally, cooperation among the less developed countries and support for one another's cause at the international level has been a continuous phenomenon of world politics since the early 1960s. The end of the Cold War, therefore, did not create a security environment conducive to collective security's scheme of 'all against one.' One can argue, then, that collective security cannot work in a security environment where using the latest war technology would mean the total destruction of the world and where the ideological grouping of states makes it impossible to mobilize collective sanctions against any major power and against its allies and friends (Claude, 1962: 191-196).

Subjective requirements for the rejection of collective security refer to *political and moral conditions that are necessary for the working of a collective security system*. We have argued above that collective security is a hard approach to the management of power; it requires states, in the final analysis, to defeat the aggressor with military means. Making and keeping commitments, willingness to shoulder responsibilities, waging wars even though doing so may conflict with national interests, and putting world order before national interests are essential for the working of a collective security system. Nevertheless, these political and moral conditions may not exist in the world we live today (Claude, 1971: 272-274).

In fact, subjective conditions are more critical than objective conditions for establishing a collective security system; without the willingness to pay the costs that collective security envisages, a change in the security environment itself would not create a change in the existing system for the management of power. This is, in fact, the main reason why the end of the Cold War did not engender a collective security system. Although there have been high expectations on the part of some scholars that the replacement of the Soviet Union by Russia at the Security Council would open up a new era in the relations among the great powers and so the Security Council would act as a new concert enforcing a system of collective security, scholars and politicians have been skeptical that this change at the Security Council would ever lead to a transformation in the policies of states with regard to the management of power.

Neither the objective nor the subjective conditions that a collective security system requires may exist in the modern era. Even though collective security as an ideal has dominated the discussions on world order, it, however, may have been rejected in practice; no matter how appealing the idea of collective security may be, statesmen and people alike may not want to pay the cost that this system requires.

However, two caveats are in order: First, the rejection of collective security as a *system* for the management of power does not mean that there did not, or will not, occur any collective response to aggressions at the international level. The UN in fact managed to mobilize collective response in both Korea and Kuwait. In the future, the UN may resort to the use of force in selective cases. Secondly, the rejection of collective security does not mean that the idea of collective security has had no effect on the management of power; the basic message that the theory has transmitted to us is that national security and world order are not necessarily mutually exclusive.



your turn 5

Given the importance of creating a balance of power in the international system and the states' concern on international cooperation, discuss how the Western (democratic) powers were able to both build consensus on security issues and create an alliance in the aftermath of the Second World War?

Summary

LO 1 Recount the philosophy of the world-government proposal

World governmentalists such as Emery Reves argued that the world as divided into nation states would inevitably be disorderly and the war would be the ultimate means to solve differences among the nation states. Whereas historical forces such as international economic interdependence require global cooperation, the humanity has been trying to solve economic and social problems in a system of states divided by clear boundaries. The result is being the human misery and the deprivation of individual autonomy for the sake of national power. Therefore, Reves rejected the internationalist approach to order and criticized the systems of both the League of Nations and the United Nations. He was convinced that "at the present stage of industrial development, there can be no freedom under the system of sovereign nation-states." In fact, looking from a broader historical perspective, Reves thought that war has occurred wherever and whenever political units of equal sovereignty have faced each other. The solution to the problem of war, then, would be "integrating the warring units into a higher sovereignty." This higher sovereignty, which is world government, would be provided with legislative, judicial, and executive powers.

LO 2 Evaluate the role of legalism in International Studies

The concept of legalism refers to a world-order approach that considers international law as the exclusive means to sustaining and promoting world order. Although the endproduct of its proponents has been a world government or world federalism, they have generally entertained the idea that world government may be created by first establishing a world confederal structure. Federalism and Confederalism, so the argument goes, would and should be achieved by uniting the world around a common global law. A general international organization, more specifically the UN, would be given the right and the capability to enforce international rules on the states and to bring any international discussion to the World Court. Some legalists, therefore, entertained the question of how the new universal organization, the United Nations, could be turned into a legal system. For example, Greenville Clark and Louis Sohn have developed in their co-authored book, World Peace Through World Law, the idea that the issues related to the maintenance of peace should be exclusively dealt by the United Nations.

LO 3 Characterize the premises of functionalism and neofunctionalism

Functionalism, as an Idealist proposal for world order, argues for the organization of international cooperation not along the line of territoriality but of specific social and economic activities. It stresses cooperative nature of world politics rather than international conflicts and, as such, addresses the problem of war and peace indirectly. The assumption here is that cooperation in economic and social activities would gradually help states to achieve mutual understanding and solve their differences, that is, cooperation in nonpolitical issues would "spill over" to political issues. Neofunctionalism, one version of functionalism, has been mainly applied to the European integration process. Since the mid-1950s, scholars looking at the European example have argued that in fact the application of functional theory at the regional level may eventually create a peaceful world. If each region in the world were peaceful, then, we would have perpetual peace at the global level. Neofunctionalism as such has been introduced as the idea of "peace in parts."

LO 4 Summarize the arguments of cosmopolitanism

Starting with the early 1970s, some world-order scholars have come to be known as cosmopolitanists. These scholars have had such common views on international relations: Environmental conditions pose a threat to order. As a result, the state has become obsolete as a political organization and it should be modified and preferably transformed in the long run; a specific understanding of justice, that is, "distributive justice," should be achieved at the global level; a global community is on the rise and that community would help achieve distributive justice; and in this process many new institutions both above and below the state level would be necessary to establish. The domestic analogy of cosmopolitanists is that- since the domestic realm is somewhat orderly because of the existence of a community and that the state sustains order through distributive justice- we can create a more orderly world by establishing a global community and achieving distributive justice at the international level. A specific group of scholars known as World-Order-Models-Project (WOMP) scholars gave specific cosmopolitan proposals for a more orderly world. Though they come from different backgrounds, WOMP scholars shared some specific global values such as individual autonomy, nonviolence, democratic participation, economic welfare, cultural integration, social justice, ecological balance, and peace. They also believed that the state system is far from realizing these values.

LO 5 Recognize the balance of power and collective security as major systems for managing power relations

Summary

Collective security prescribes a partially centralized system for the management of power. Although, states still possess the means of power, resort to force is regulated by a central agency, which is a general international organization such as the League of Nations or the United Nations. Second, in this agenda, aggression would be deterred not by an equilibrium of power but by a preponderance. As such, collective security holds that most, if not all, states must remain committed to the system to deter the potential aggressor, and, when needed, participate in collective actions to punish the aggressor. Third, although collective security prescribes imposing on the aggressor moral, diplomatic, and economic sanctions, its credibility as a deterrent relies ultimately on military sanction. Fourth, collective security is a "one for all, all for one" scheme in that states are believed to be committed to deter and punish the aggressor, regardless of their own identities and the aggressor's identity; put differently, states are supposed not to discriminate between friends and foes. Finally, related to the fourth point, collective security opposes the alliance-building policy, and it rather prescribes a universal alliance.

The balance of power, on the other hand, is a decentralized system for managing of power relationships. Two ideas on the balance of power as a system merit attention. First, the balance of power is a "fallback system" of international relations; in a multistate system, unless an alternate system is established for the management of power, it is natural for states to take care of their own security. Second, the classical balance system of the earlier centuries has been modified by two major developments in this century; the establishment of general international organizations, and the creation of institutionalized alliances such as NATO. Then, the system that we have had for the management of power since the establishment of the League of Nations may be called a "modified balance of power system."

1 Peace in positive sense refers to ---?

A. Peace in negative sense
B. Order in narrow sense
C. The absence of war
D. The absence of coercion
E. Social order

2 According to Emery Reves, the world was disorderly because of the following reasons EXCEPT---?

A. International economic interdependence
B. The international system of states
C. Concern for national power
D. Equal sovereignty
E. A system divided by clear boundaries

3 According to Cord Meyer, to which of the following institutions the power to legislate should be given?

A. The UN Security Council
B. The UN General Assembly
C. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
D. The UN Secretary General
E. A hegemon

4 To which of the following did Hans Kelsen relate the failure of the League of Nations?

A. Its founding fathers
B. The creation of a Permanent Court
C. The rejection of membership in the League by the US Senate
D. Placing the Council at the center of the organization
E. The leadership of Britain and France in the organization

5 Which of the following books did Greenville Clark and Louis Sohn co-author?

A. Beyond the Nation-State
B. Peace Through Law
C. World Peace Through World Law
D. Einstein on Peace
E. Power Among Nations

6 Which of the following approaches defended the idea of "spill over"?

A. Legalism
B. World governmentalism
C. Cosmopolitanism
D. Functionalism
E. Realism

7 Separability refers to the assumption that we can separate---?

A. Nation-states from the international system
B. Leadership style of a state from its grand strategies
C. Philosophical issues from realities
D. Mind and spirit from body
E. Political issues from nonpolitical issues

8 Which of the following has Cosmopolitanism defended?

A. The morality of state
B. International skepticism
C. A global community
D. Hobbesian morality
E. Realist morality

9 Which of the following is the "one for all, all for one" scheme for managing power relations in the international system?

A. The balance of power
B. Neofunctionalism
C. Regionalism
D. Collective security
E. World Order Model Project

10 Which of the following was specifically created to externally balance the power of some states in the system?

A. The League of Nations
B. The United Nations
C. The International Court of Justice
D. The European Union
E. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Answer Key for "Test Yourself"

1. E	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Introduction
2. A	If your answer is not correct, review the section on World Government
3. B	If your answer is not correct, review the section on World Government
4. D	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Legalism
5. C	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Legalism
6. D	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Functionalism
7. E	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Functionalism
8. C	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Cosmopolitanism
9. D	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Collective Security And The Balance Of Power As Systems For Managing Power Relations
10. E	If your answer is not correct, review the section on Collective Security And The Balance Of Power As Systems For Managing Power Relations

Discuss the premises of major IR theories on "sovereignty" and the place of the state in world politics.

your turn 1

Grand theories of IR differed on the issues of sovereignty and the place of the state in world politics. Realists have considered state sovereignty as something sacred and opposed any proposal that may weaken the privileged position of the state in world politics. Issues such as minority rights and human rights have not been looked on favorably by Realists. On the other hand, Idealists have considered the state as the main problem in world politics. If the state were substituted by a higher authority, we would then have an orderly world. However, relatively pragmatic scholars argued that the state has still important functions in world politics. It can both be a service agent to individuals at the domestic level and shoulder responsibilities at the international level, including frustrating and defeating aggressors if necessary. Sovereignty as such refers to basic responsibilities and duties of the state. Moreover, from the pragmatic liberal perspective, national interests and global goals are not and should not be two mutually exclusive objectives of the state. National interests, when broadly defined, include the notion of improving the international milieu.

Discuss the position of major IR theories on values, norms, and justice.

your turn 2

The issue of justice aroused much controversy among the main IR theories and political philosophies. According to Realists, it is not possible to achieve justice in the international system. Because each state has a different understanding of justice and it has the right to push that understanding at the international level. As Thucydides observed (and wrote in the History of the Peloponnesian War), the notion of justice may be relevant only among equals: "it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can." Idealism, on the other hand, has assumed an opposite view on justice. For Idealists, justice is not only achievable but also necessary and urgent for world order. Pragmatic liberal approach has also acknowledged the importance of other values than stability in the system. World order, broadly defined, is a social order for this approach. However, from this perspective, order defined in a narrow sense, or stability, is prerequisite to other values. Therefore, Claude, for example, believed in a notion of justice, but he has also argued that consensus on the definition of justice would not be easy. Creating consensus in this issue adds up to defending a "bottom up" approach rather than hoping to impose a common understanding of justice on political entities with a "top down" institutional design

Suggested answers for "Your turn"

Toward creating a relatively orderly and peaceful world, discuss the relationship between the individual and the structure. In your discussion, touch on the assumptions of the major IR theories on universal values and domestic forces such as the political regime.

your turn 3

Both liberalism and realism provide a partial explanation of the interaction between democracy and peace in particular and of international politics in general. Even if democracies might be conducive to peaceful foreign relations, we however still have to work with the international systemic forces. National interests and security concerns did, and in the future may, drive nations to many conflicts. Therefore, in building theories of International Relations and formulating foreign policies we cannot disregard the systemic forces. To improve the existing international system, however, we can bridge the gap between liberalism and realism. Toward this end, a pragmatic approach may provide the basic philosophical principles. Such an approach suggests that rather than a top-down approach such as imposing democracies on nations, we need a bottom-up approach that would study and emphasize the effects of domestic forces on improving relations between humans and states alike in the international system. Such an approach can bridge the gap between liberalism and realism in many issues of world politics such as the role of states and international organizations, sovereignty, norms, power, and the regime type. Not a certain type of government, but the appreciation of democratic universal principles such as nonviolence, belief in human values, resorting to peaceful means in solving political problems, and promoting social justice can create regional peace as well as perpetual peace. Nature, as Kant theorized, will help us in this endeavor. However, it seems that we also Both liberalism and realism provide a partial explanation of the interaction between democracy and peace in particular and of international politics in general. Even if democracies might be conducive to peaceful foreign relations, we however still have to work with the international systemic forces. National interests and security concerns did, and in the future may, drive nations to many conflicts. Therefore, in building theories of International Relations and formulating foreign policies we cannot disregard the systemic forces. To improve the existing international system, however, we can bridge the gap between liberalism and realism. Toward this end, a pragmatic approach may provide the basic philosophical principles. Such an approach suggests that rather than a top-down approach such as imposing democracies on nations, we need a bottom-up approach that would study and emphasize the effects of domestic forces on improving relations between humans and states alike in the international system. Such an approach can bridge the gap between liberalism and realism in many issues of world politics such as the role of states and international organizations, sovereignty, norms, power, and the regime type. Not a certain type of government, but the appreciation of democratic universal principles such as nonviolence, belief in human values, resorting to peaceful means in solving political problems, and promoting social justice can create regional peace as well as perpetual peace. Nature, as Kant theorized, will help us in this endeavor. However, it seems that we also need to help nature- another fact that is appreciated by Kant. Liberals have disregarded the effect of the systemic forces on foreign policy formulation, whereas realists have rejected to see the possibility that human beings can modify the nature of international politics and even transform the system. Liberals have stressed the Interaction between Democracy and Peace, and the role of institutions whereas realists have stressed the structures. However, any theory that does not take into account the interaction between the individual and the structure borders on dogmatism; and any political regime that does not adopt as its main objective the improvement of the position of the individual at every social level should be opposed regardless of its label (See, Doğan, 2008).

Discuss Kant's understanding of "Perpetual Peace." According to Kant, what are the prerequisites for creating perpetual peace?

your turn 4

Liberals seem to be arguing that simply democratic values and institutions did, and in the future can, create peaceful relations between likeminded states. However, this is a very broad reading of Kant. Perpetual peace, for Kant, can come true neither quickly nor easily. It is rather "the end of the hard journey." Some wars must be waged, and, some lessons must be learned in this process. Kant theorizes that republican states can build a security community among themselves and may have to resort to force to protect this community. Kant bases his hope for perpetual peace on leadership and nature. "If he lives among others of his-own species," Kant writes, "man is an animal who needs a master." This master, however, can be found "nowhere else but in the human species." Leaders will be aided by nature in their endeavor to both create a zone of peace among republican states and ultimately realize world peace. Kant argues that perpetual peace is guaranteed by no less an authority than the great artist nature herself." Kant concludes as follows: "Even if people were not compelled by internal dissent to submit to the coercion of public laws, war would produce the same effect from outside. What men have neglected to do will ultimately happen of its own accord, albeit with much inconvenience. As Bouterwek puts it, if the reed is bent too far, it breaks; and he who wants too much gets nothing" (See, Doğan, 2008).

Given the importance of creating a balance of power in the international system and the states' concern on international cooperation, discuss how the Western (democratic) powers were able to both build consensus on security issues and create an alliance in the aftermath of the Second World War?

your turn 5

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the democratic nations were able to cooperate on security issues around certain principles. These are the principles that the multilateral approach (multilateralism) has been arguing, that is, indivisibility, nondiscrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. The process leading up to the signing of the Washington Treaty that established NATO reflects all of these principles. The Soviets' expansionist policies had urged the Western powers to reconsider their approach to institutionalized cooperation on security issues. Cooperation among the Western powers, however, required a mind change in their approach to security issues and a major transformation in their foreign policies. A handful of statesmen were influential in this regard. Each of them had seen the necessity of a multilateral solution to the security problems in the postwar era. They came to believe that: a) all democracies should unite their efforts toward defeating any aggression by autocratic nations, b) European nations should reconcile their differences because the poverty and insecurity of a free nation does not mean the security of other like-minded states; c), they should solve their differences through peaceful means so as to unite their power in deterring aggression, and d) they should leave the door open to other democratic nations in the effort to bring stability to European politics. In other words, some statesmen at critical positions in a handful of democracies came to believe that security among the democratic nations was an indivisible issue. Moreover, this cooperation would be based on reciprocal obligations rather than one power or a group of nations shouldering all the responsibility or the domination of all other nations by one powerful state. As a result of this belief, all the major powers including the USA, France, Britain, and Canada transformed their foreign policies before the negotiations actually started in mid-1948 (See, Doğan: 2005).

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